Under Section 5(g) of the DIS Act, the President of Botswana holds the authority to extend DIS protection to government officials beyond those explicitly listed in the law. This discretionary power is meant to address special circumstances requiring enhanced security measures. However, recent actions under President Duma Boko’s administration have sparked debate over the boundaries of this discretion and the proportionality of such decisions
At the beginning of January 2025, President Boko’s administration withdrew DIS protection for several high-ranking officials who were granted security under former President Mokgweetsi Masisi. This decision marked a shift in governance priorities
An April 2025 statement from the Office of the President addresses the security arrangements of State Presidency Minister Moeti Mohwasa. The statement clarifies that the security decisions were not personally directed by Boko, but rather made collectively by security agencies based on alleged risk assessments.
This is not only a lie but equally unlawful. The statement bears the hand of Montlenyane Baaitse, its handwriting similar to that of one Edward Robert especially when puppeteered by a modus operandi of controversial Peter Fana Magosi.
A key point in the statement is that heightened security measures were previously in place for the Minister of Defence, Justice and Security, but after a government reconfiguration, those responsibilities were merged into the State Presidency. This supposed shift explains why security protocols for Minister Mohwasa now resemble those used in the past.
For the record, the DIS alongside the DCEC were moved from the Ministry of Defence and Justice to the Office of the President in April 2012. Therefore, it is Minister Morwaeng who should have enjoyed this perk.
By their own admission, it is clear that this exercise to protect Mohwasa was done without adequate oversight mechanisms even to the extent of usurping President Boko’s power, which categorically has no delegation function in respect of the matter at hand. The discretionary nature could potentially lead to concerns about favouritism, executive overreach, or politicization of national intelligence operations.
The focal point of the debate is whether Minister Mohwasa, truly requires such protection. Globally, legitimate risk assessments rely on six critical areas to determine the need for security measures.
The profile of the official is the starting point. As Minister of State Presidency, Mohwasa is indisputably prominent in government, warranting careful consideration. And so is Maipelo Mophuting. Yet, there appears to be a disparity in the application of these measures. Assitant Minister Maipelo Mophuting has not received equivalent protection, a discrepancy that invites inquiry.
Evaluating the broader socio-political climate and analysing geographic threats is a second consideration. Rising tensions, protests, or instability can increase risks to public officials, as seen in high-risk regions like South Sudan or during the anti-apartheid protests of South Africa in the 1980s. Botswana’s recent political transition has been marked by a spirit of maturity and peace, which seems to preclude the existence of substantial threats.
Effective risk assessments examine credible threats from extremist groups, criminal networks, or individuals. In this case, no tangible or verified threats have been identified and remain unsubstantiated, making this exercise appear unnecessary and disproportionate.
A fourth consideration is analysis of past incidents involving the official, their predecessors, or similar figures. If officials in comparable roles have faced targeted attacks, this could indicate a pattern of risk.
Actually, in the history of Botswana, only one politician has suffered a severe beating at the hands of another albeit in extracurricular affairs. The victim drew water from the well of his assailant’s spouse. Wives should never be mistaken for communal boreholes.
Minister Mohwasa enjoys public goodwill as shown by positive public perception and media sentiment. His official schedule, including travel plans and public appearances including in the recent commemoration of Selibe Phikwe Secondary School, have not given any indication of any vulnerabilities.
In view of the above, the alleged risk assessments is disproportionate to the socio-political climate and the security measures are not proportional, effective, and misaligned. There is no actual risk whatsoever. The explanation by the alleged security cluster raises questions about the integrity of the process, as it appears not only misleading but also contrary to the principles of transparency and accountability outlined in the Act.
While discretion lies with the leadership, assessments informed by robust intelligence and historical precedent make all the difference between effective protection and overreach. This is DIS overreach, solely intended to entangle Mohwasa. By prioritizing protection for Minister Mohwasa without substantial justification, the administration risks ensnaring him in unnecessary political controversy.
In light of these revelations, it would be prudent for Comrade Caesar to reject DIS protection outright, reaffirming a commitment to transparency and integrity. Doing so would not only mitigate public doubts but also restore confidence in the impartiality of the first administration of the Second Republic.